Abstract
What is common between Veg Biryani, Ronaldo and Donald Trump? All of them pretend to be
something that they are not. Not Biryani, not the GOAT (Greatest Of All Time) and not human. But
again, many a true word is spoken in jest. We pretend just as we breathe. Pretense is observable all
around us. Feigning sickness to avoid work, lying to get out of trouble, maintaining a persona or a
child joyfully playing his doll are all instances of make-believe. Global platforms of communication
have made the world smaller than ever before. With degrees of separation reducing by the day, we can
now interact with numerous people almost instantly. More interactions means more dialogue among
people, which means more pretense. Sometimes we even pretend about pretending, for example, when
applying reverse psychology. The bottom-line is that, pretense is a very important phenomenon in our
lives, which we exploit regularly. Therefore, it is only fitting that there be an account which rigorously
analyses and explains pretense.
No matter how grounded in reality, due to its nature, pretense always involves an element of fantasy.
This role is fulfilled by imagination. It provides the necessary content and helps us in guiding an
episode of pretense. The nature of this content however is a topic hotly contested in philosophy. Does it
comprise of clear or fuzzy images? Or whether images form a part of it at all? Are there different forms
of imagination? Moreover, can one even provide a distinction between different types of imagination?
We discuss and answer all such questions in Chapter 2, and clear the air up regarding its nature and
involvement in pretense.
Having gathered all the information needed about imagination as an essential component of pretending, we then move on to the act itself. Pretense involves both mental as well as physical participation of
our body. Therefore, an analysis of the cognitive aspects of pretense is necessary to ascertain the precise
requirements for pretending. By studying, the two most definitive accounts, viz. metarepresentational
account and the behavioural account of pretense we get to know about the important characteristics of
pretending. Along the way, we also learn from their shortcomings to bolster our own command of the
topic.
After strengthening the theoretical backbone needed to properly understand the phenomenon of
pretense, we apply our learning from the first three Chapters and proceed towards applying them in a
computational paradigm. We are presented by the perfect problem in the shape of Humour and Sarcasm
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as two forms of pretense, where we can flex our knowledge and use it to improve the accuracy of
existing computational systems. In Chapter 4 we work towards formulating the problem of determining
different types of humor as a traditional classification task by feeding positive and negative datasets to
a classifier. We develop a model to categorize various kinds of humour based on the mode of delivery,
the theme of the joke and the topic of the joke. Then, we illustrate its functionality by applying it on
a huge corpus one-liners. Finally, we bring closure to our work in Chapter 5. We make headway in
detecting sarcasm by making use of contextual information derived from the history of the participants.
Therefore, instead of treating the problem of detecting sarcasm as a mere lexical exercise, we have tried
to model a system that tries to build an understanding of the whole process as a human would do.