Abstract

In recent years, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have received significant attention from the research community. With a straightforward implementation and outstanding results, GANs have been used for numerous applications. Despite the success, GANs lack a proper theoretical explanation. These models suffer from issues like mode collapse, non-convergence, and instability during training. To address these issues, researchers have proposed theoretically rigorous frameworks inspired by varied fields of Game theory, Statistical theory, Dynamical systems, etc. In this paper, we propose to give an appropriate structure to study these contributions systematically. We essentially categorize the papers based on the issues they raise and the kind of novelty they introduce to address them. Besides, we provide insight into how each of the discussed articles solves the concerned problems. We compare and contrast different results and put forth a summary of theoretical contributions about GANs with focus on image/visual applications. We expect this summary paper to give a bird’s eye view to a person wishing to understand the theoretical progress in GANs so far.

Abstract

In the last decade, civic crowdfunding has proved to be effective in generating funds for the provision of public projects. However, the existing literature deals only with citizen's with positive valuation and symmetric belief towards the project's provision. In this work, we present novel mechanisms which break these two barriers, i.e., mechanisms which incorporate negative valuation and asymmetric belief, independently. For negative valuation, we present a methodology for converting existing mechanisms to mechanisms that incorporate agents with negative valuations. Particularly, we adapt existing PPR and PPS mechanisms, to present novel PPRN and PPSN mechanisms which incentivize strategic agents to contribute to the project based on their true preference. With respect to asymmetric belief, we propose a reward scheme Belief Based Reward (BBR) based on Robust Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism. With BBR, we propose a general mechanism for civic crowdfunding which incorporates asymmetric agents. We leverage PPR and PPS, to present PPRx and PPSx. We prove that in PPRx and PPSx, agents with greater belief towards the project's provision contribute more than agents with lesser belief. Further, we also show that contributions are such that the project is provisioned at equilibrium.

Abstract

Machine learning models are extensively being used in decision making, especially for prediction tasks. These models could be biased or unfair towards a specific sensitive group either of a specific race, gender or age. Researchers have put efforts into characterizing a particular definition of fairness and enforcing them into the models. In this work, mainly we are concerned with the following three definitions, Disparate Impact, Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds. Researchers have shown that Equalized Odds cannot be satisfied in calibrated classifiers unless the classifier is perfect. Hence the primary challenge is to ensure a degree of fairness while guaranteeing as much accuracy as possible. Fairness constraints are complex and need not be convex. Incorporating them into a machine learning algorithm is a significant challenge. Hence, many researchers have tried to come up with a surrogate loss which is convex in order to build fair classifiers. Besides, certain papers try to build fair representations by preprocessing the data, irrespective of the classifier used. Such methods, not only require a lot of unrealistic assumptions but also require human engineered analytical solutions to build a machine learning model. We instead propose an automated solution which is generalizable over any fairness constraint. We use a neural network which is trained on batches and directly enforces the fairness constraint as the loss function without modifying it further. We have also experimented with other complex performance measures such as H-mean loss, Q-mean-loss, F-measure; without the need for any surrogate loss functions. Our experiments …

Abstract

Civic crowdfunding (CC) is a practice with which interested players can raise funds for a civic project. With Blockchains gaining traction, CC can be implemented in a reliable, transparent and secure manner with smart contracts. The fundamental challenge in CC is free riding. PPR, the proposal by [Zubrickas, 2014] of refund bonus to the contributors in the case of the project not getting provisioned has interesting properties. As observed by [Chandra et al, 2016], PPR faces a challenge of race condition. To address this, their proposal, PPS considers the temporal aspects of a contribution. However, PPS is computationally complex and is difficult to explain to a layperson. In this work, we look for all important properties a refund bonus scheme must satisfy in order to discourage free riding while avoiding the race condition. We identify Contribution Monotonicity and Time Monotonicity as sufficient conditions for this. We propose three refund bonus schemes satisfying these two conditions leading to three novel mechanisms for CC-PPRG, PPRE, and PPRP. We show that PPRG is the most cost-effective mechanism when deployed as a smart contract. We then prove that under certain assumptions on valuations of the players, in PPRG, the project is funded at equilibrium

Abstract

The internet has transformed the way we communicate ideas and share knowledge. Online discussion forums (ODFs) play an important role by providing a platform for the internet users to interact. There exist numerous ODFs where participants (ie the agents) can post the reviews of events, restaurants, movies, books, services, and so on. Such online forums are also commonly used as a web-based discussion platform to discuss academic topics, personal experiences, views, etc. We are motivated by forums such as Quora, Stack Exchange, Reddit, WikiAnswers, and Yahoo! Answers, which provide a platform for open-ended discussions, and by platforms such as Piazza and iClicker which supplement traditional classroom teaching. These forums are also used by massive online

Abstract

The popularity and applicability of mobile crowdsensing applications are continuously increasing due to the widespread of mobile devices and their sensing and processing capabilities. However, we need to offer appropriate incentives to the mobile users who contribute their resources and preserve their privacy. Blockchain technologies enable semi-anonymous multi-party interactions and can be utilized in crowdsensing applications to maintain the privacy of the mobile users while ensuring first-rate crowdsensed data. In this work, we propose to use blockchain technologies and smart contracts to orchestrate the interactions between mobile crowdsensing providers and mobile users for the case of spatial crowdsensing, where mobile users need to be at specific locations to perform the tasks. Smart contracts, by operating as processes that are executed on the blockchain, are used to preserve users’ privacy and make payments. Furthermore, for the assignment of the crowdsensing tasks to the mobile users, we design a truthful, cost-optimal auction that minimizes the payments from the crowdsensing providers to the mobile users. Extensive experimental results show that the proposed privacy preserving auction outperforms state-of-the-art proposals regarding cost by ten times for high numbers of mobile users and tasks.

Abstract

This paper explores Thompson sampling in the context of mechanism design for stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems. The setting is that of an MAB problem where the reward distribution of each arm consists of a stochastic component as well as a strategic component. Many existing MAB mechanisms use upper confidence bound (UCB) based algorithms for learning the parameters of the reward distribution. The randomized nature of Thompson sampling introduces certain unique, non-trivial challenges for mechanism design, which we address in this paper through a rigorous regret analysis. We first propose a MAB mechanism with deterministic payment rule, namely, TSM-D. We show that in TSMD, the variance of agent utilities asymptotically approaches zero. However, the game theoretic properties satisfied by TSM-D (incentive compatibility and individual rationality with high probability) are rather weak. As our main contribution, we then propose the mechanism TSM-R, with randomized payment rule, and prove that TSM-R satisfies appropriate, adequate notions of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. For TSM-R, we also establish a theoretical upper bound on the variance in utilities of the agents. We further show, using simulations, that the variance in social welfare incurred by TSM-D or TSM-R is much lower when compared to that of existing UCB based mechanisms. We believe this paper establishes Thompson sampling as an attractive approach to be used in MAB mechanism design.

Abstract

The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurrencies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high computational resources at the miners. Despite advances in mobile technology, existing cryptocurrencies cannot be maintained by mobile devices due to their low processing capabilities. Mobile devices can only accommodate mobile applications (wallets) that allow users to exchange credits of cryptocurrencies. In this work, we propose LocalCoin, an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal computational resources, produces low data traffic and works with off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s security with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transaction are colluders. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight proof-of-work scheme and (ii) a distributed blockchain. We analyze LocalCoin for double spending for passive and active attacks and prove that under the assumption of sufficient number of users and properly selected tuning parameters the probability of double spending is close to zero. Extensive simulations on real mobility traces, realistic urban settings, and random geometric graphs show that the probability of success of one transaction converges to 1 and the probability of the success of a double spending attempt converges to 0.

Abstract

The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurrencies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high computational resources at the miners. Despite advances in mobile technology, existing cryptocurrencies cannot be maintained by mobile devices due to their low processing capabilities. Mobile devices can only accommodate mobile applications (wallets) that allow users to exchange credits of cryptocurrencies. In this work, we propose LocalCoin, an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal computational resources, produces low data traffic and works with off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s security with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transaction are colluders. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight proof-of-work scheme and (ii) a distributed blockchain. We analyze LocalCoin for double spending for passive and active attacks and prove that under the assumption of sufficient number of users and properly selected tuning parameters the probability of double spending is close to zero. Extensive simulations on real mobility traces, realistic urban settings, and random geometric graphs show that the probability of success of one transaction converges to 1 and the probability of the success of a double spending attempt converges to 0.

Abstract

There are numerous situations when a service requester wishes to expertsourcea series of identical but non-trivial tasks from a pool of experts so as to achieve an assured accuracy level for each task, in a cost optimal way. The experts available are typically heterogeneous with unknown but fixed qualities and different service costs. The service costs are usually private to the experts and the experts could be strategic about their costs. The problem is to select for each task an optimal subset of experts so that the outcome obtained after aggregating the opinions from the selected experts guarantees a target level of accuracy. The problem is a challenging one even in a non-strategic setting since the accuracy of an aggregated outcome depends on unknown qualities. We develop a novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanism for solving this problem. First, we propose a framework, Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB)framework, which leads to a MAB algorithm, Constrained Confidence Bound for Non-Strategic Setting (CCB-NS). We derive an upper bound on the number of time steps this algorithm chooses a sub-optimal set, which depends on the target accuracy and true qualities. A more challenging situation arises when the requester not only has to learn the qualities of the experts but has to elicit their true service costs as well. We modify the CCB-NS algorithm to obtain an adaptive exploration separated algorithm Constrained Confidence Bound for Strategic Setting (CCB-S). The CCB-S algorithm produces an ex-post monotone allocation rule that can then be transformed into an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism. This mechanism learns the qualities of the experts and guarantees a given target accuracy level in a cost optimal way. We also provide a lower bound on the number of times any algorithm must select a sub-optimal set and we see that the lower bound matches our upper bound up to a constant factor. We provide insights on a practical implementation of this framework through an illustrative example and demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms through simulations